Reputation Poisoning
Generate malicious or harmful outputs to damage the agent operator's reputation
Tactic
Impact (Stage 9)
Modify data, deploy malicious code, or disrupt services
Attack Class
ORG-SKILL-SPREAD
Propagating malicious capabilities across an organization's agent fleet through shared skills and registries
Evidence
Well-understood traditional technique applied to the AI agent context.
DVAA Validation
Reproductions in Damn Vulnerable AI Agent, the OpenA2A intentionally-broken agent for kill-chain validation.
malicious output generation
Honeypot Coverage (AgentPwn)
In scope for honeypot observation; trap page or telemetry hook not yet built.
Evidence Source Breakdown
Evidence Timeline
HMA check SUPPLY-001 failed on fake-vulnerable-agent
HMA check SUPPLY-001 failed on fake-vulnerable-agent
HMA check SUPPLY-001 failed on opena2a/code-review-skill
HMA check SUPPLY-001 failed on opena2a/code-review-skill
HMA check SUPPLY-001 failed on fake-vulnerable-agent
HMA check SUPPLY-001 failed on damn-vulnerable-ai-agent
HMA check SUPPLY-001 failed on hackmyagent-release-test-vplv
Detection (HackMyAgent)
npx hackmyagent secure --ciLive = check implemented in hackmyagent; queued = declared, not yet implementedDefense (OASB Controls)
How to Cite
AI Agent Threat Matrix T-9005 (Reputation Poisoning). OpenA2A, 2026. https://threats.opena2a.org/techniques/T-9005